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Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives (Continuum Studies in Philosophy) | 
enlarge | Author: Kevin Timpe Publisher: Continuum Category: Book
List Price: $130.00 Buy New: $81.85 You Save: $48.15 (37%)
New (15) Used (4) from $81.85
Sales Rank: 300747
Media: Hardcover Number Of Items: 1 Pages: 155 Shipping Weight (lbs): 1 Dimensions (in): 9.2 x 6.3 x 0.7
ISBN: 0826496253 Dewey Decimal Number: 123.5 EAN: 9780826496256 ASIN: 0826496253
Publication Date: September 23, 2008 Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days Shipping: International shipping available Condition: Brand New, Perfect Condition, Please allow 4-14 business days for delivery. 100% Money Back Guarantee, Over 1,000,000 customers served.
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| Editorial Reviews:
Product Description This is an important and engaging book on a key argument in contemporary debates about free will and moral responsibility.Much contemporary scholarship on free will focuses on whether it is compatible with causal determinism. According to compatibilists, it is possible for an agent to be determined in all her choices and actions and still be free. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, think that the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. There are two dominant general conceptions of the nature of free will. According to the first of these, free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does. On this view, free will centrally depends upon alternative possibilities.The second approach focuses instead on issues of sourcehood, holding that free will is primarily a function of an agent being the source of her actions in a particular way. This book demarcates these two different conceptions free will, explores the relationship between them, and examines how they relate to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. It ultimately argues for a version of Source Incompatibilism.
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