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How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida | 
 enlarge | Author: Seth G. Jones
Publisher: RAND Corporation
Category: Book
List Price: $33.00
Buy New: $20.60
You Save: $12.40 (38%)
New (15) Used (10) from $19.78
Avg. Customer Rating:  1 reviews
Sales Rank: 329475
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 252
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.9
Dimensions (in): 8.8 x 6 x 0.7
ISBN: 0833044656
Dewey Decimal Number: 363.32516
EAN: 9780833044655
ASIN: 0833044656
Publication Date: July 25, 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
All terrorist groups eventually end. But how? Most modern groups have ended because they joined the political process or local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa1ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policing and intelligence, not military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa1ida.
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| Customer Reviews:
Growing Consensus October 27, 2008
1 out of 2 found this review helpful
There appears to be a growing consensus within the U.S. Counter-Terrorism Community that the strategy formulated under the rubric, "Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT) has been a costly failure. As this latest Rand Corporation study makes clear, the al Qaeda movement against which the GWOT was in theory directed has actually grown stronger since 9/11 in spite of or because of the GWOT.
In this monograph Jones and Libicki have made a study (as the title implies) of how various terrorist movements over the last thirty years have actually been shut down. Realizing that each terrorist movement has many unique features unlike any others, they still maintain that the majority of such movements have been either assimilated into various political systems or destroyed by means of police and intelligence work. Indeed the serious damage done to the al Qaeda movement's Iraqi Branch in Anbar Province through a combination of local policing operations supported by U.S. and Iraq Army operations is one of the few examples they site where military force was effective against terrorists. On the whole they maintain that countering terrorism is essentially a law enforcement operation supported by effective intelligence collection and analysis not a military problem.
Having made this point, They then outline the elements of what they think would be a successful strategy against the al Qaeda movement. Their strategy reflects the strategic thinking of probably the majority of anti-terrorist experts in 2008. This does not mean that they are right, but suggest there is a consensus growing on what would constitute an effective U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
Among the several common threads running through this consensus is the need for a broad range of actions to counter the al Qaeda ideology, a better understanding of the structure and principals of al Qaeda through better intelligence, the use of local police and security services rather than U.S. forces. Some of the enablers for this strategy would clearly be more relevant U. S. diplomatic operations, better police and intelligence liaison operations with foreign security services, and above all a viable U.S. Intelligence System. Such strategy may be well worth a try since the GWOT has apparently failed to achieve its primary goal.
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